[DOWNLOAD] "Report Commission On Family Courts" by Supreme Court of Florida Supreme Court of Florida # eBook PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: Report Commission On Family Courts
- Author : Supreme Court of Florida Supreme Court of Florida
- Release Date : January 10, 1994
- Genre: Law,Books,Professional & Technical,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 66 KB
Description
The United States Supreme Court vacated our decision in State v. Lancaster, 687 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 1997), and remanded the case for further consideration in light of its decision in Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997); See Lancaster v. Florida, 118 S. Ct. 37 (1997). This is another case involving the application of ex post facto principles to a legislative change in the gain time statutes. In our prior opinion we found there was no ex post facto violation and that the legislature could constitutionally make a disadvantageous, retroactive change in Administrative Gain Time because overcrowding gain time was designed to alleviate unpredictable prison overcrowding. As explained in more detail below, we find that the United States Supreme Court decision in Lynce mandates a holding that ex post facto principles do apply to overcrowding credits. In this opinion we approve in part and quash in part the Fourth District Court of Appeals decision in Lancaster v. State, 656 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). We further instruct the State to apply the principles expressed in this decision to all similarly situated inmates. We note that this case is distinguishable from Meola v. Department of Corrections, Nos. 89,982, 90,148 & 90,241 (Fla. Dec. 24, 1998), and Thomas v. Singletary, Nos. 90,128, 90,188 (Fla. Dec. 24, 1998), in which we are denying relief. Meola and Thomas, as well as another gain time case, Gomez v. Singletary, Nos. 90,642, 90,654 90,655, 90,759 & 90,829 (Fla. Dec. 24, 1998)(granting relief) are being released simultaneously with this case. At the outset, it must be recognized that neither the legislature, the attorney general, nor this Court has been able to convince the United States Supreme Court that the Ex Post Facto Clause in the United States Constitution does not apply to gain time statutes. In 1979, we held in accordance with the theory and argument of the Attorney General that gain time statutes were a matter of legislative grace. See Harris v. Wainright, 376 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1979). At approximately the same time, we denied another petition relying on Harris. See Weaver v. Graham, 376 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1979). On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, that Court disagreed and reversed our judgment in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981). The Supreme Court found that a legislative act changing the gain time statutes enacted after the commission of a criminal act could not constitutionally be used to extend a defendants sentence. Id. at 968. More recently, in 1996, we again accepted the States view that the cancellation of gain time given inmates for the purpose of relieving prison overcrowding did not violate ex post facto principles because overcrowding gain time was not "earned," but rather, was awarded solely for administrative purposes, and therefore an inmate had no vested right in retaining such gain time. See Calamia v. Singletary, 686 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 1996). Again that view has been rejected and our opinions in Calamia and this case have been vacated by the United States Supreme Court. See Calamia v. Singletary, 117 S. Ct. 1309 (1997)(judgment vacated pursuant to Lynce), mandate confirmed to, 694 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1997)(relief granted on remand); Lancaster v. Florida, 118 S. Ct. at 37.